Manus AI Security and Privacy: An Enterprise Risk Register

Manus can receive prompts and uploads and operate with third-party credentials. It can also use connectors and Browser Operator data and execute files or commands in cloud sandboxes. Its privacy policy describes task logs and third-party AI providers. An enterprise review therefore needs several data paths, each with its own owner, retention and evidence requirements, plus an exit test.

I would approve Manus by deployment mode and task type rather than with one company-wide yes or no. The useful artifact is a risk register that shows where data enters, which Manus-controlled feature handles it, what leaves that feature, and what evidence the customer can retain.

TL;DR

• Manus's privacy policy covers prompts, uploads, third-party credentials, connectors, Browser Operator data, sandbox files and commands, task logs, and third-party AI providers.
• The policy says de-identified data may be used for model improvement. It also gives specific sandbox-retention periods for free and paid plans.
• Manus lists SOC 2 Type 1 and Type 2 plus ISO 27001 and ISO 27701, along with technical and organizational security controls.
• Hosted Manus agents, sandboxes, memory, connectors, and native provider calls remain outside DeepInspect unless a customer explicitly routes a controllable HTTP model/API path through it.

The register starts with the data path

The Manus Privacy Policy, updated September 28, 2026, documents several input and processing surfaces. It covers prompts and uploaded material, third-party credentials, connectors, Browser Operator data, files and commands in sandboxes, task logs, and third-party AI providers. Those surfaces create different review questions even when they appear inside one Manus task.

A prompt may contain corporate text. An upload can carry a document with its own retention requirement. A connector can expose data held in another service. Browser Operator activity can interact with a live website. A cloud sandbox can hold files and execute commands. The risk register should preserve those distinctions because the control owner changes across them.

Put each route on one page with arrows. I want the reviewer to see the browser tab, connector, sandbox, provider, and enterprise system as separate boxes. If the diagram turns all five into a cloud labeled "Manus," the review has hidden the decision it was supposed to support.

Prompts, uploads, and task logs

The privacy policy establishes that Manus processes prompts and uploads. It also maintains task logs. The enterprise should classify the content permitted in each surface before rollout. Public marketing tasks may fit a broader allowance than sensitive work, including legal analysis and source-code review, especially when regulated records are involved. One approved product can still require several usage policies.

For every approved task class, the register should identify the data owner and the evidence available after execution. It should also record the deletion route and any customer archive outside Manus. The policy's general retention language belongs beside the task-level record rather than being copied into a universal retention promise.

Customer-side logs can support accountability, but copying full prompts and uploads into a ticketing or SIEM system creates another sensitive store. The AI vendor security questionnaire provides a structure for data categories, subprocessors, deletion, and evidence requests.

Credentials and connectors expand authority

Manus's policy covers third-party credentials and connectors. That means the risk review must follow the authority those credentials grant. The key fields are the connected service, credential owner, approved purpose and available scope, plus the revocation owner and evidence of connector activity.

A connector can give a hosted agent access to information beyond the text a user typed. The deployment decision should therefore use a test account with intentionally limited data and permissions. Reviewers can then observe which records become available and what the resulting task log shows. Production credentials should follow only after that bounded test.

Credential rotation and revocation remain enterprise responsibilities even when the hosted service stores or uses the credential. The register should name the person who can revoke access during an incident. I would reject a rollout where that owner is listed as "IT" and no individual has tested the revocation path.

Browser Operator creates a live application route

The privacy policy explicitly includes Browser Operator data. A browser-operating agent can encounter information displayed by a live application. It can also act inside the session available to it. That path deserves its own risk entry rather than being grouped with a text prompt.

The acceptance test should use a controlled account and a harmless task. Record the pages reached and visible data, then the attempted action and its result in the available Manus evidence. Then test a restricted page or disallowed action.

Browser Operator activity remains inside a Manus-controlled route unless the customer has separately inserted a control into a specific HTTP API path. A gateway that governs model calls cannot automatically govern a hosted browser session or every application action performed through it. The ChatGPT Enterprise and Microsoft Copilot comparison explains the same general boundary between hosted workspaces and customer-controlled API traffic.

Cloud sandboxes need a lifecycle rule

Manus says its sandboxes can hold files and commands. The privacy policy states that sandbox data is retained for up to seven days on free plans and up to 21 days on paid plans. These are published periods for that surface. They should not be generalized to prompts, account records, task logs, connectors, or third-party providers.

The register should record which tasks may place files in the sandbox, who owns those files, the expected deletion point, and the customer's verification step. A downloaded output enters the destination repository's retention regime.

A sandbox command can also affect resources reachable from that environment. The review should identify permitted destinations and the owner of any downstream system. DeepInspect cannot observe local command execution inside a Manus-hosted sandbox. That activity belongs to Manus's controls and the customer's task design. The connected system's permissions are part of that design.

Third-party AI providers and improvement use

The privacy policy identifies third-party AI providers and says de-identified data may be used for model improvement. Those are separate register fields. Provider processing asks where task data goes to produce a result. Improvement use asks what may be used later under the policy's de-identification terms.

The enterprise should request the provider and subprocessor details for its purchased service and deployment region. It should also document the approved interpretation of the improvement-use language with legal and privacy owners. The policy confirms the published treatment at the review date. A contract or plan-specific term may add conditions that the public page alone cannot establish.

Account deletion is generally processed within 30 days according to the policy. That statement should be recorded with its scope and date. It should not be rewritten as immediate deletion from every provider, backup, log, or customer-controlled destination without supporting terms.

Security attestations support diligence

The Manus Security page lists SOC 2 Type 1 and Type 2 as well as ISO 27001 and ISO 27701. It also describes encryption controls, employee checks, penetration testing, change and configuration management, and deletion of customer data when a customer leaves.

Those claims are relevant to vendor diligence. The enterprise still needs the applicable report scope, period, service coverage, and any carve-outs through its procurement process. A certification label cannot answer which connector a user enabled or which data entered a sandbox during a particular task.

Operational due care therefore sits beside diligence. Review the public and contractual evidence while restricting task classes and testing deployment routes. Retain customer-side approval records. The enterprise AI governance guide gives that approval process a broader home.

Retention and departure need separate tests

The policy supplies a general account-deletion period and specific sandbox periods. The security page says customer data is deleted on departure. Before rollout, procurement should ask Manus to map those statements across prompts, uploads, task logs, Browser Operator data, connector-derived data, memory, credentials, sandbox files, and third-party providers.

The departure test should define what the customer exports, what it deletes, when access is revoked, and what written confirmation it expects. Run the same checklist when a paid plan changes because the published sandbox periods differ between free and paid plans.

A clean exit is an operational event. The strongest evidence is a dated export and deletion record tied to named surfaces, followed by credential revocation in the connected systems. A general cancellation email leaves too much unresolved.

DeepInspect

DeepInspect fits only where the customer owns an authenticated HTTP model/API route and deliberately sends it through the gateway. On that route, DeepInspect can evaluate identity-aware policy and retain a per-decision record before forwarding permitted traffic.

Manus-hosted agents, Browser Operator, cloud sandboxes, connectors, memory, and native model-provider calls remain outside that boundary. A useful architecture review marks those routes plainly and assigns controls to their actual owners. Book a technical deep dive at deepinspect.ai.