MCP Inspector fetch proxy response has no effective memory bound
The network proxy reads an upstream response into memory and serializes it again for the browser. An oversized or never-ending response can therefore exhaust backend memory.
Security incidents involving Model Context Protocol servers and tooling: supply-chain campaigns, credential disclosure, path traversal, and SSRF. Each entry links to primary sources and the disclosed CVE where one exists.
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The network proxy reads an upstream response into memory and serializes it again for the browser. An oversized or never-ending response can therefore exhaust backend memory.
The fetch proxy can preserve caller-supplied authentication headers across a redirect to a different origin. A server controlling that redirect can receive credentials intended for the original destination.
The maintainer documents an incomplete earlier fix in which requests without an Origin header regain access to a sensitive process-launch function. The authentication boundary must hold even when that optional browser header is absent.
An OAuth callback from a hostile authorization server can introduce connection settings that replace the original HTTP transport with a local process transport. That permits command execution on the Inspector host.
An attacker-controlled remote server can supply an OAuth authorization URL that reaches a PowerShell command string. On Windows or WSL, shell interpolation can turn that URL into local command execution.
A crafted interface URL can override the proxy address used during initial configuration loading. The client can then send its session token to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Unexpected handler exceptions are returned to the peer with their underlying stack and causes. A connected client or server can therefore learn implementation details from failures in the opposite side.
The HTTP transport allocates persistent session state on initialization without a default expiry or session-count bound. A client that repeatedly initializes without deleting its sessions can exhaust server memory.
The stateless servlet transport accepts JSON-RPC without enforcing the expected request content type. Where origin checks and authentication are also absent, a malicious page can make a browser invoke tools on a reachable server.
Pillar Security disclosed that an attacker-controlled remote MCP server could execute arbitrary code on Windows or WSL machines during OpenCode's OAuth flow. The issue affected OpenCode 1.0.137 through 1.18.32; Anomaly shipped version 1.18.33 on September 28, before the public research disclosure.