LLM Endpoint HTTP Method Allowlists for Authenticated Requests
An LLM endpoint HTTP method allowlist binds each authenticated route to the small set of HTTP actions it actually implements. This guide maps RFC 9110 method semantics to inference, files, batches, and administration; explains 405 and Allow handling; and gives a test and audit pattern for gateways. The objective is to reject method drift before a request reaches model infrastructure.

The HTTP method is the primary source of request semantics. RFC 9110 Section 9.1 says it identifies the request's purpose and the client's expected successful result. An authenticated LLM API should therefore match the verified identity and method to the route as one policy key. POST /v1/responses may be valid while PUT /v1/responses is meaningless, and DELETE /v1/files/{id} may require a different role from GET on the same path. A blanket method policy is lazy architecture. I would block it in review.
TL;DR
- Build method allowlists per exact LLM route, not per hostname or service.
- Evaluate authentication and role against the normalized method-route pair before reading or forwarding an inference body.
- Return 405 with an accurate
Allowfield when the method is known but unsupported on that resource. - Separate 405 from 501 and route absence. Keep authorization denial distinct so logs preserve the real failure.
- Test every route with its allowed methods and at least one prohibited method.
Method and route form one operation
HTTP methods carry standardized semantics. GET retrieves a current representation, POST asks the resource to process request content, PUT replaces current representations, and DELETE removes them. RFC 9110 also defines HEAD, CONNECT, OPTIONS, and TRACE. The target resource decides which methods it implements or allows.
LLM APIs use these semantics across different operations. A model list often supports GET. Inference commonly uses POST because the server processes prompt content and returns an action result. A file-deletion route commonly assigns that operation to DELETE. Batch status may use GET, while batch creation uses POST. An administrative policy route can use PUT, but that does not grant PUT meaning on an inference path.
Write the allowlist at route-template granularity. A card on the architecture wall should read POST /v1/responses: user, agent-service in thick marker. Put DELETE /v1/files/{id}: file-admin on a separate card. The visual separation makes authority review concrete. A hostname-wide set such as GET, POST, PUT, and DELETE throws away that distinction.
Normalize the target before policy evaluation
The policy point must match the same resource the origin will use. Normalize the scheme and authority according to the API contract. Apply its path rules and route template without inventing a different target. Preserve the original target for evidence. Method tokens are case-sensitive under RFC 9112 Section 3.1, and standardized methods use uppercase by convention.
Avoid automatic correction of an odd method or malformed target. RFC 9112 warns that correcting an invalid request line can let deliberately crafted input bypass filters along the chain. The edge and gateway need parsing rules aligned with the application before any method allowlist has value.
Evaluate the complete header section before applying the request. RFC 9110 notes that later fields may contain authentication credentials or conditionals. They may also contain misleading duplicates. For an authenticated LLM request, bind the verified subject and role to the exact method-route pair, then apply body and model policy. The post-authentication gap is the difference between recognizing a valid caller and authorizing this operation now.
405 and 501 describe different failures
RFC 9110 distinguishes an unrecognized or unimplemented method from a method that the server knows but the target resource rejects. The first case should receive 501 Not Implemented. The second should receive 405 Method Not Allowed. Section 15.5.6 requires the origin server to include an Allow field listing methods currently supported by the target resource.
Keep that distinction at the gateway. A known DELETE sent to an inference route should produce 405 if the gateway represents the origin policy. A made-up method that the service never implements belongs in the 501 path. A missing route can remain 404 according to the API's disclosure policy. A caller lacking authority for an otherwise supported operation belongs in the authorization path, often 403.
Do not use 405 as a universal security response. It hides role failures and weakens audit evidence. At the same time, consider how much Allow reveals on sensitive administrative routes. RFC 9110 requires it on an origin-generated 405, so access design should avoid publishing privileged operations on a broadly reachable route and hoping an omitted field will hide them.
Method properties affect retries and side effects
RFC 9110 classifies GET, HEAD, OPTIONS, and TRACE as safe because their defined semantics are read-only. It separately defines idempotency, which affects retry behavior. An inference POST can consume budget, create a conversation object, start a tool sequence, or produce an externally recorded event. A proxy must never reinterpret it as a safe read just because the model response contains text.
Bind retry rules to the route and method contract. An intermediary that retries POST after a connection failure can duplicate model work unless the API supplies an idempotency mechanism. A GET route should avoid hidden state changes that matter to the user. Method enforcement gives the organization a clean place to attach these operational requirements.
The OWASP API Security mapping for LLM endpoints places function authorization and resource consumption beside authentication. A method allowlist supports both reviews, but it does not replace object ownership, role checks, token ceilings, or workflow approval.
Gateways should reject before model work
Perform method authorization after the gateway has enough information to authenticate the request and identify the route, but before body parsing that triggers expensive work. A disallowed method should produce no provider request ID or model token count. It should also produce no tool invocation.
Use a decision sequence with explicit owners:
- Parse the request line and complete header section under one HTTP policy.
- Authenticate the user or calling service. For a service, record whether it is a workload or agent and attach supplied role context.
- Match the normalized target to an approved route template.
- Look up the allowed methods and the roles permitted for the selected operation.
- Return the defined 404, 405, 501, or authorization response.
- Continue to media-type, body-size, schema, prompt, and model policy only after the method gate passes.
The order stays within authenticated user or agent traffic sent to LLM infrastructure. It says nothing about local inference or a direct provider call that bypasses this route.
Test the negative method matrix
Generate an acceptance matrix from the route registry. Every route gets positive fixtures for each supported method and negative fixtures for every other method your service recognizes. Include lowercase method tokens, OPTIONS, HEAD, TRACE, CONNECT, and custom methods if any component implements them.
Run every fixture through the full HTTP chain. A gateway may block TRACE while the origin enables it. A framework may synthesize HEAD for a GET route. CORS middleware may answer OPTIONS before application authorization. Those behaviors need an explicit policy decision rather than an accidental default.
For a 405 fixture, verify the status and Allow value. Also verify the correlation ID, absence of model invocation, and consistent behavior across replicas. For a role failure, verify that a permitted method still fails under the wrong authenticated identity. Place the gateway log beside the model-provider dashboard during review. The timestamp should appear on the gateway side only. The LLM security testing guide gives the broader regression structure for retaining these fixtures.
Audit records should preserve method intent
Record the authenticated subject and the agent or workload identity. Preserve the original method token and normalized route, then add the route template, allowed method set, role decision, policy version, status, and correlation ID. If Allow is returned, capture the value emitted. Keep the request body out of a method-rejection log unless a separate evidence policy requires it.
Keep the route registry under explicit version control. A change that adds DELETE to a file route expands the operation surface and should receive the same approval as a new endpoint. Removing POST from an older inference version should produce a clear deployment event and deterministic 405 results after the cutoff.
Watch for drift between gateway configuration and origin behavior. A route that returns 200 at the origin but 405 at one ingress region has split policy. An origin that accepts PUT after the gateway allows only POST creates bypass exposure for direct paths. Inventory every reachable model endpoint and test the same matrix at each governed ingress.
DeepInspect
DeepInspect operates on authenticated HTTP traffic routed between users or agents and LLM endpoints. It can evaluate the supplied identity and role context with the exact method, route, and model destination, then deny a request before prompt content reaches model infrastructure. Method policy can run beside media-type, size, prompt, and response controls.
Each decision can produce an independent record containing the method-route pair, caller context, policy version, and outcome. The application owns route design and trustworthy identity context. Network controls and endpoint inventory must ensure callers use the governed path, since a direct route that bypasses it remains outside the decision point.
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