AI Governance for Government and Public Sector.
Civilian agency staff, defense analysts, state benefits adjudicators, and law-enforcement personnel are sending controlled unclassified information, case files, beneficiary data, and criminal justice information into ChatGPT, Copilot, Azure OpenAI Government, AWS Bedrock GovCloud, and internal AI tools. The gateway between those users and the model is where FedRAMP, FISMA, NIST 800-53, OMB M-25-21, CJIS, and IRS Pub 1075 need to be applied, because the content control plane the LLM provider offers stops at the model boundary and is blind to the agency policy.
DeepInspect runs inline in front of the AI provider. CUI, PII, FTI, CJI, and mission-specific data classes are detected and transformed before the payload leaves the authorization boundary. Every decision is written to a tamper-evident forensic record with the policy version, the actor identity, and the original and transformed payloads preserved. The same configuration applies to interactive chat, retrieval-augmented agency applications, and autonomous agent workflows that reach into case management, benefits, and law-enforcement systems.
The risk surface in government AI
CUI, PII, and mission data inside prompts
Agency staff paste case files, eligibility records, investigative reports, and constituent identifiers into AI tools to draft, summarize, or classify. Once that payload leaves the FedRAMP boundary, the System Security Plan no longer covers it. The CSP agreement covers downstream handling, not the act of disclosure.
Records evidence for FOIA, IG, and OMB reporting
FOIA, Inspector General, GAO, and OMB requests on AI-assisted decisions all rest on the same artifact: a contemporaneous record of who used the AI, on which data, under which policy, and what the model produced. Most agencies are unable to produce that record because the AI interaction log either does not exist or sits inside the LLM provider in a form the agency cannot retrieve.
Shadow AI outside the authorization boundary
Staff reach commercial chat tools from agency endpoints. Every such request moves agency data outside the FedRAMP boundary and outside the SSP. The control needs to live at the egress gateway so the request is inspected and the policy is applied before the payload leaves.
Agents reaching into agency systems of record
Autonomous agents now query case management systems, benefits engines, and law-enforcement databases. A misrouted tool call or a prompt-injected agent can change a record, issue a benefit, or expose a watchlist. The control needs to live at the agent gateway, because the downstream system trusts the agent identity.
How DeepInspect applies controls
CUI, PII, FTI, and CJI detection
Deterministic detectors match CUI categories under 32 CFR Part 2002, PII patterns, FTI identifiers under IRS Pub 1075, and CJI fields under the CJIS Security Policy. Each match is redacted, tokenized, or blocked according to the configured action for the user role in effect.
Identity-aware policy with PIV/CAC integration
Role identity is supplied by the agency IdP at request time, including PIV and CAC-backed identities. The gateway evaluates the per-role action map and applies the matching transformation. The action map is part of the policy version, so role changes are captured in the audit trail.
Evidence-grade forensic record
Every interaction writes a signed record containing the actor identity, the policy version, the rule evaluation path, the original payload, the transformed payload, and the upstream response. The record set supports the AI use case inventory under OMB M-25-21, the impact assessment, and the response to FOIA, IG, and GAO requests.
Prompt injection and adversarial input handling
Adversarial inputs inside case attachments, constituent submissions, and open-source intelligence feeds are scored against the configured detectors and blocked or routed to escalation according to policy. The score, the input, and the action are preserved in the forensic record.
Tool and agent allowlists for agency systems
Autonomous agents reach case management, benefits, and law-enforcement systems. The gateway enforces allowlists and blocklists on the tools an agent invokes and the data sources it reads. An agent that attempts to call a system outside its allowlist is stopped at the gateway with a record of the attempt.
Forensic deep analysis for insider risk and slow exfiltration
Patterns across the forensic store surface anomalous access, repeated near-miss policy hits, and the kind of slow exfiltration that single-event monitoring misses. The analysis runs against the agency projection and produces queryable findings that map back to the source interactions.
Regulatory mapping
FedRAMP and FISMA
The gateway is deployed inside the agency authorization boundary on FedRAMP-authorized infrastructure. The forensic record supports the AU control family in NIST 800-53 Rev 5 and the continuous monitoring obligations under FISMA. The agency keeps custody of the data and the records.
NIST AI Risk Management Framework
The Govern, Map, Measure, and Manage functions in AI RMF 1.0 and the Generative AI Profile (NIST AI 600-1) rely on a contemporaneous, decision-level record set. The gateway produces that record set and exposes it through a queryable projection for the AI risk management program.
OMB M-25-21 and M-25-22
M-25-21 governance, AI use case inventory, and impact assessment obligations rest on the contemporaneous decision record. M-25-22 acquisition obligations call for vendor evidence on data handling and audit. The gateway record supports both, including the post-deployment monitoring CAIOs are expected to operate.
CJIS Security Policy
Criminal Justice Information that flows through an AI interaction is in scope. The gateway enforces advanced authentication at the AI request boundary, writes an attributable audit record, and blocks payloads that contain unredacted CJI from leaving the agency boundary.
IRS Pub 1075
FTI detection prevents return data from entering the model context. The audit-trail and need-to-know access requirements in Pub 1075 map directly to the gateway record. The agency keeps FTI inside its accreditation boundary.
Privacy Act of 1974 and E-Government Act PIAs
System of Records Notices and Privacy Impact Assessments cover the data the agency processes. The gateway record gives the agency privacy officer the evidence that the SORN-covered data was handled inside the boundary the PIA documents.
The scale of the gap
is the global average cost of a data breach in 2024. Public-sector breaches consistently land at or above this average because the response and notification overhead is heavier.
AI use cases were reported across federal agencies in the latest consolidated inventory, up sharply year over year. Every use case in the inventory is also a use case that the CAIO has to monitor under OMB M-25-21.
of organizations reported confirmed or suspected AI agent security incidents in the past year. Government adoption tracks the same curve, with the added overhead of accreditation and records obligations.
of builders cite the absence of auditability and logging as a top concern. Only 7.7% audit agent activity daily, which leaves most agencies without the contemporaneous record that NIST 800-53 AU controls and OMB M-25-21 monitoring require.
Deployment
The gateway runs self-hosted inside the agency authorization boundary on AWS GovCloud, Azure Government, or on-premises. CUI, PII, FTI, CJI, the forensic store, and the transaction object store stay inside the boundary in every configuration.
DeepInspect sits inline between users, agents, and the AI provider. It works with Azure OpenAI Government, Bedrock GovCloud, and internal models without requiring a model migration. PIV and CAC-backed SSO, agency SIEM, and DLP integrations stay in place. Production cutover typically lands inside two weeks for a defined application scope.
Policy on every AI interaction, enforced before data leaves the boundary.